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Abstract 
This paper explores the consequences of globalisation for the labour markets. By defining globalisation as 'the 
consequence of the diminishing costs of distance the analysis is able to use the economist's standard trade theory to 
show explore the impact of globalisation on labour mobility in the impact of trade of labour conditions, and of 
differential mobility (the favouring of skilled migrants over unskilled migrants). Some consideration is given to the 
particular circumstances of the New Zealand labour market. One conclusion of this - all to brief- paper is to insist 
that migration must be seen in the context of a particular sort of globalisation of the labour market. 
Introduction 1 
It is argued that globalisation was a far more potent force 
in the nineteenth century, than it has been in the late 
twentieth, for then labour was highly mobile as well as 
capital and goods - although it was really only European 
labour which was mobile. Moreover, aside from 
initiative, the labour which migrated probably had similar 
characteristics to those which stayed behind.2 
In contrast, today there are restrictions on labour 
mobility, which tend to favour the skilled and the rich. 
However, such international labour mobility there is, is 
no longer confined to Europeans and their descendants. 
Indeed in some respects Europeans are today more 
satisfied with their lot, and are less inclined to migrate 
outside the continent, so the greatest pressures come from 
inhabitants of second and third world economies. It 
would be wrong to assume that there is an international 
labour market (except in a very few select occupations) 
but it would be equally wrong to assume that labour was 
fixed in location, as is usually postulated in standard 
international trade models. 
The result is that we rarely have a clear vision of the 
international labour market, and the policy responses tend 
to be ad hoc - as in the case of the current debate about 
immigrants. This paper tentatively explores some of the 
issues. 
1 I am grateful for some useful comments on an earlier version 
of this paper from Bill Rosenberg. 
2 K.H. O'Rourke & J.G. Williamson (1999) Globalisation and 
History: The Evolution of a Ninteenth-Century Atlantic 
Economy, MIT. 
Globalisation 
My work uses the definition of globalisation as 'the 
consequences of reductions in the cost of distance'. 3 It 
argues that even if geographical distances have not 
changed, distance has effectively diminished because the 
time involved, the resources used, and the insecurity of 
travel and transport have all reduced. However the 
diminution differs by that which is travelling. While the 
reductions for goods shipped by sea have been dramatic, 
they are small in comparison to the reductions for people 
and goods which were once shipped by sea and now fly, 
while the reduction in the costs and times of moving 
information are such that the effective distance is near 
zero. 
The previous sentence is from a perspective of New 
Zealand in the world. A more comprehensive account 
would mention the spectacular reductions that have 
occurred from railways in the nineteenth century and road 
transport in the twentieth. Their impact on the 
development of North America and Europe has been 
enormous, and even the regional economic structure of a 
country as tiny as New Zealand is undergoing changes as 
the costs of land transport diminish. However the focus in 
this paper is the international dimension. A central feature 
of this approach is that many of the difficulties on 
globalisation arise from the fact that different costs of 
distances diminish at different rates. 
3 e.g. B. H. Easton, (2002) Towards An Analytic Framework for 
Globalisation, publication pending, on website 
www.eastonbh.ac.nz. 
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The diminishing costs of distance impacts on labour 
markets in a variety of ways. Most obviously it changes 
the relative costs of home and foreign supply, favouring 
the latter. A particular case is where there are strong 
economies of scale in the production process, so that even 
if the two countries have identical endowment shares and 
available technologies, industry in the larger country will 
expand at the expense of the smaller country. Transport 
costs are natural protection and the consequence of their 
reduction is a diminution in that protection. Probably this 
effect is far more important today than the reductions in 
tariff and other government protections, and arguably 
latter is a consequence of the former. 
The Relevance of Trade Theory 
One merit of treating transport costs as natural protection 
is that the standard trade models can be used to analyses 
the effects of the change, although the models have to be 
used in full rather than in their partial form which look 
only at the difference between an international trading 
regime with tariffs and one without. Moreover such 
phenomenon as economies of scale and technological 
change are integral and should not be omitted from the 
model as they tend to be at the elementary level. 
In particular, product specialisation and economies of 
scale generate intra-industry trade, that is trade in both 
directions between two countries in broadly the same 
product (so Germans buy Renaults and Frenchmen buy 
Volkswagens). This does not seem to markedly change 
the anaylsis of labour markets under globalisation, 
although it changes dramatically our understanding of 
what is, and can be, traded. However further investigation 
may suggest some interesting propositions - especially 
about the significance of skills. 
Despite it being one of the driving forces behind the anti-
globalisation movement, one issue which this paper does 
not pay a lot of .attention to is that any increasing of 
international trade will result in the redeployment of 
factors (including labour) from some industries to others. 
Typically this redeployment will involve some 
unemployment and - often severe - social adjustment by 
the those involved. It is even possible that some factors 
will never be redeployed. While not wanting to minimise 
the distress, or the concerns of those who protest against 
policies which exacerbate this adjustment, the focus of 
this paper is where long term adjustment has occurred, 
and factors are fully redeployed. This provides some 
insights, not all of which are as favourable to 
globalisation as its advocates claim. 
Globalisation with Immobile Labour 
To begin with the standard assumption that only goods 
travel and that capital and labour are fixed in each 
economy. A reduction in protection (while the model 
looks at tariffs, but it also broadly applies for transport 
costs), which increases trade between two countries, will 
generally favour the factors which are used more 
intensively in the industries which expand and 
disadvantage those more intensively deployed in the 
industries which contract. One of the main focusses of 
this scenario is the shift of manufacturing from first to 
third world economies, with the implication that there 
will be a relative reduction in wages in the first world 
manufacturing industries which are competing with the 
third world. 
In its extreme form this 'factor price equalisation' does 
not seem to apply, but presumably there is a tendency. In 
particular the theory suggests that products from third 
world countries based on their abundance of unskilled 
labour will undercut the domestically produced 
equivalents, and press down on the wages of the 
unskilled in the first world. As a result there will be a 
tendency for the margins for skill to open up in the first 
world (and to close in the third world). 
In effect this trade exports unskilled labour from the third 
world to the first world by embodying it in traded goods. 
For instance, India - among others - can provide call 
centre workers at lower cost than New Zealand can. We 
might imagine Indians flying to New Zealand each day, 
working in the call centre, and then flying home, with no 
other impact on New Zealand society. Travel costs aside, 
the effect would be to reduce the wage rates of local call 
centre operators, and decrease their wages relative to 
other New Zealand workers which the Indians cannot 
displace. In fact, the travelling is unnecessary because 
exceptionally cheap international telecommunications 
means the call operators can work at home and yet supply 
(export) the service to New Zealand. So the impact on 
potential local call operators is the same as if the Indians 
were working in New Zealand. 
There is evidence that margins for skill have increased in 
the first world in the last three decades. But it is not clear 
that this is due to increasing trade. Many experts attribute 
the increase to technical change which tends to favour 
skilled workers. For instance, it seems likely that new 
technologies displace unskilled workers and/or create 
opportunities for skilled workers or for skills that did not 
previously exist. However this is not a unanimous 
conclusion, and even these experts acknowledge that 
there is probably some effect on margins for skill from 
the globalisation ofproduction.4 
Moreover, whatever may have been happening in the 
past, it is not impossible that the globalisation effect will 
intensify in the future as distance costs come down, 
protection is reduced, and particularly, China increases its 
role in the world market. However it is not clear what 
4 P.R. Krugman & M. Obstefeld (2000) International 
Economics: Theory and Policy, Addison-Wesley, 5th ed, p.79-
81. For a view which gives more weight to the impact of trade 
on the income distribution see D. Baker & M. Weisbrot (2001) 
Will New Trade Gains Make Us Rich? An Assessment of the 
Prospective Gains from New Trade Agreements, Centre for 
Economic and Policy Research, Washington. 
14 Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2002 
range of goods and services or component processes the 
phenomenon will apply to. We may not be surprised that 
all underwear production has moved offshore, but frrst 
world fashionware may survive because of the demands 
of niche markets, the needs of design closely integrated 
with the production process, and the requirement for 
high-skilled quality-controlled products. Obviously there 
are a few vulnerable industries remaining in New Zealand 
(most notably textile, clothing and footwear, where 
border protection is still moderately significant), but the 
bigger threat from third world exporters may be to New 
Zealand's Australian markets as its tariffs and distance 
costs of suppliers are reduced. 
One policy response to the loss of unskilled jobs from 
globalisation is to systematically upskill (and redeploy) 
the labour force. Given that the increasing margins for 
skill is not solely due to international trade, but that new 
technologies seem even more important, one might 
conclude that there is a strong case for the 
upskilling/redeployment strategy. 
What to do about the margins for skill? Generally 
economists are cautious about policies which try to 
squeeze the margins in wage rates because that may make 
those goods and services most dependent upon unskilled 
labour less competitive to overseas producers. Moreover, 
as the next section discusses, skilled labour is 
internationally mobile, and to some extent pay influences 
where it settles. Squeezing skilled wages encourages 
emigration (and the failure to return). 
Globalisation with (Skilled) Migration 
Thus far we have assumed that the labour is confined to a 
particular economy. While migration flows may not be as 
relatively great as they were in the nineteenth century, 
they remain substantial. As the introduction noted, the 
difference is that the mobility no longer applies to 
unskilled Europeans. Today the mobile - to a greater or 
lesser degree - are suitably skilled workers of all races. 
(There is some mobility of the lesser skilled as refugees 
and illegal immigrants.) Even so, the size of the likely 
flows are such that in the long run there is likely to be 
substantial geographical change in the patterns of 
employment. 
Because this paper concentrates on the labour market, it 
assumes that capital and technology are reasonably 
(although probably not perfectly) mobile. (The 
assumption could have been made in the previous section 
without loss of the general conclusions, although it would 
change the transition paths and timing.) What is explored 
here is the impact of migration of skilled rather than 
unskilled workers. 
It is argued that the nineteenth century migration 
benefited workers in the country of origin because it 
reduced the number of workers on the land. 5 The explicit 
5 O'Rourke & Williamson (1999) op. cit. 
assumption here is that there was diminishing returns to 
land on which the workers farmed: the implicit 
assumption is labour was homogeneous. Today's 
migrants do not generally come from farms (although 
there may be a chain reaction in which the urban based 
unskilled migrants of the third world leave positions for 
farm workers to take over), and they are not 
representative of the labour markets they leave. 
It is generally assumed that all migrants are better off 
because they chose to migrate, although there are 
obviously some caveats here such as they may have been 
misinformed and unable to return. The situation of 
workers in the destination country is more complicated, 
since there will be a tendency of the immigrants to push 
their wages down. However if there are economies of 
scale or if the skills the immigrants bring are 
complements to the domestic workers skills the wage 
pressure may be offset by productivity gains. The 
implications for the domestic sector are very situation 
specific, as they are also for source country. So we need 
to explore a relevant example. 
Consider a particular labour skill migrating, say, from 
New Zealand to Europe, because its factor return is 
higher in Europe than New Zealand. Because they have 
chosen to move, the New Zealanders with the skills are 
better off, while those already in Europe with the same 
skills will experience lower wages from the additional 
supply and be worse of£ (This assumes that economies of 
scale are not important.) But what about the rest of those 
involved? 
The migration of labour, capital/savings and technology 
are all facilitated by the falling costs of distance. There is 
a tendency to assume that such migration is necessarily a 
good thing, but it is not always · clear what are the 
assumptions that are being used to justify the conclusion. 
Typically the analysis ignores the distributional impact of 
the change. Even if both the source or destination 
economy are better off in the sense that per capita output 
is higher, there may be people who are worse off. 
Curiously, and not in line with what is generally assumed, 
the unskilled need not be necessarily worse off from 
skilled immigration. For instance if there is 
complementarity in the production process between the 
skills and the unskilled (and assuming some capital 
mobility) an immigrant inflow may create opportuinities 
for the local unskilled. But such is the complexity of the 
issue even this conclusion is subject to the caveat, that the 
unskilled may have been even better off had some of 
them been upskilled, rather than sourcipg the skills from 
overseas (assuming that domestic upskilling is possible). 
The Globalisation of the Labour Market 
To summarise, the global labour market is likely to 
continue to have strong barriers to the mobility of most-
especially unskilled - labour, although there will be 
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substantial movements of world population in the long 
run. 
International trade is a means of generating some of the 
outcomes which have some analogies to greater 
international mobility of labour. In particular it should 
depress the remuneration of unskilled labour in rich 
countries (as would an inflow of unskilled labour from 
poor countries). However, the magnitude of this effect 
seems small (and _the increasing margins for skill in rich 
countries can be attributed more to biases in 
technological innovation). It is possible the effect will 
accelerate with further reductions in the cost of distance 
and China (in particular) becoming a more dominant 
exporter of general manufactures. 
Skilled labour is likely to be increasingly mobile, and this 
will be largely independent of the ethnicity - or other 
cultural attributes - of those workers. The impact of the 
workers in the destination (or source) country is not clear, 
because different circumstances have quite different 
outcomes. 
The Implications for New Zealand 
The globalisation of the (skilled) labour market has two 
implications for New Zealand. The first, about 
emigration, is that many New Zealanders are going to be 
welcome in other rich countries, and they will afford 
themselves of the opportunity to take up the invitation -
for many it will be permanently or for a long period. 
Some of the policy issues which come out of this paper 
are: 
I. To what extent is the acquisition of New Zealander's 
mobile skills to be funded by the state or by the 
individual, given that the beneficiary country may not 
always be New Zealand? 
2. What steps should New Zealand take to attract its 
expatriates back to New Zealand? The question assumes 
that OE will be a major- and increasing- element in the 
experience of New Zealanders. 
3. Is it possible to harness New Zealand expatriates in the 
interests of New Zealand? (An interesting attempt to do 
this is the Kiwi Expatriate Association - KEA - which 
tries to create connections which involve expatriates in 
New Zealand projects.) 
The second group of questions involve the offsetting 
immigration. While some immigrants will be of refugees 
and for family reunion, an important component will be 
skilled labour and also immigrants with capital. among 
the policy questions that have to be worked through are: 
4. What is the purpose of this immigration? Note that it 
will not contribute greatly to increasing New Zealand's 
population size. An extra 5000 immigrants a year (net) 
adds about 350,000 to the population over a 50 year 
period (including from the births to migrants), an 
additional .15 percent p.a. to the rate of population 
growth. Nor does it seem likely that the aging of the 
population can be delayed significantly by any likely 
migration flow. (A related issue is what is the maximum 
rate which the economy and society to absorb 
immigrants, without putting excessive pressure on New 
Zealand.) 
5. Suppose the purpose is a part of skills enhancement. If 
migration policy is (largely) a skills enhancement 
strategy, should it not be integrated with a strategy -
which currently hardly exists - to upskill the New 
Zealand population? 
6. Insofar as part of the immigration policy is to bring 
investors (entrepreneurs belong to the skills strategy) to 
New Zealand, how effective are they, and what 
advantages does the strategy have - if any - over simply 
recruiting the capital without giving residential rights to 
the investors? 
These six questions are not comprehensive and they omit 
migration issues which are not strictly labour market 
ones, such as this which involve refugees and family 
reunions. 
In regard to the cultural questions, it should be noted that 
some 19.5 percent of New Zealand residents in 2001 
were born overseas. Out of the 18 OECD countries for 
which data is available, only Australia at 24 percent has a 
higher proportion and only Canada, Sweden, and the 
United States exceed 10 percent. It is inevitable that 
immigrants will be culturally different from the existing 
population, and there is an issue of the ability of New 
Zealand's absorption rate (culturally and economically). 
Undoubtedly the culture and vitality that migrants bring 
with them can contribute to a dynamic society. However 
it is possible to exaggerate this - often for quasi-racist 
reasons. For instance Asian migrants contribute to the 
transformation of New Zealand, but the economic forces 
of globalisation and the penetration of overseas ideas and 
fashions, together with the internal dynamic of New 
Zealand society are far more important in the 
transformation than any Asianisation. There is a danger 
we may attribute to Asian immigrants all the 
uncomfortable aspects of the transformation, even when 
they were caused by other processes, and ignore the 
Asian contribution to the positive aspects of the 
transformation. 
Taking on a partial perspective to an issue while ignoring 
the wider context is not peculiar to cultural aspects 
migration. Indeed one point of this- all to brief- paper is 
to insist that migration must be seen in the context of a 
particular sort of globalisation of the labour market. 
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